#### COSC 301 Network Management and Security

#### Lecture 13: Remote Terminal Services and SSH

#### What is a terminal?

• Original terminals – TeleTYpewriter (TTY)



#### - DEC VT-100 terminal



### What is a terminal? (cont.)

- Terminal emulator
  - a program that does what an original terminal used to do
  - Terminal window

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#### Remote TTY after Internet

- Berkeley 'r'-commands
  - -rsh
  - -rlogin

- remote shell commands remote terminal
- -rcp remote copy
- No password needed as the authentication is hostbased
- Telnet
  - -Remote terminal, similar to rlogin
  - User-based authentication
  - -Clear text password

#### Problems

- Everything sent in clear-text, no encryption
- Weak Host-based authentication
  - Exploitable trust relationships
  - Privileged ports offer little protection
- Server not authenticated
  - Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack potential

#### **Solutions**

- Encrypt all traffic
- Authenticate both user and server
- This is where SSH comes in

#### Secure SHell (SSH)

- SSH provides secure versions of the 'r'commands and telnet
- Encrypts all traffic
  - Public/Private Key for authentication
  - Fast block cipher for data transfer
- Authenticate both server and client/user

# Public Key Encryption

- Choose two prime numbers p and q, N=p x q
- Generate e and d according to p and q so that
  - -For any message/number M,
  - $-M^{exd} \mod N = M$
- Modulo property  $-M^{exd} \mod N = (M^e \mod N)^d \mod N = M$
- Encryption: e is public key, N is publicly known
   -C = M<sup>e</sup> mod N
- Decryption: d is private key
   -C<sup>d</sup> mod N = (M<sup>e</sup> mod N)<sup>d</sup> mod N = M
- N is a very large number so factor N is time consuming.

#### Authentication with PKI

#### • AP5.0

- Use the public key encryption in AP4.0
- The protocol has the following procedures
  - Alice sends "I am Alice", to Bob
  - Bob sends a nonce, R, to Alice
  - Alice encrypts the nonce using Alice's private key A and sends the encrypted nonce back to Bob
  - Bob decrypts the received message using Alice public key. If the decrypted nonce equals the nonce he sent Alice, then Alice is authenticated.







Bob computes  $K_{\overline{A}}(K_{\overline{A}}(R)) = R$ 

#### The retrieval of the public key could be a security hole

# MITM

- Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM)
  - Can it happen with public key encryption?
  - If so, how?



#### MITM under PKI



If Bob does not verify the public key sent by Trudy, MITM attack establishes

Lecture 13: Remote Terminal Services and SSH

## How to prevent MITM?

• Verify the host/user public key

```
[-bash-4.2$ ssh hzy@vertex.otago.ac.nz
The authenticity of host 'vertex.otago.ac.nz (10.81.166.21)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:z9M2TMCOyl0hCrcsvMcxLevUs7xEs0Pw/bsA7Fg94GU.
ECDSA key fingerprint is MD5:72:5f:bd:d4:e2:21:87:c6:b1:51:65:18:a9:1f:09:ea.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
```

- -You can use ssh-keygen to find out the fingerprint of a public key
- -E.g. ssh-keygen -If ssh\_host\_dsa\_key.pub
- Store the public key of your trusted server into the known\_hosts file under .ssh directory

#### **Basics of SSH**

- User Authentication
- Host Authentication
- Data Encryption
- Data Integrity



# Keys in SSH

- User Key
  - A persistent, asymmetric key used by clients as proof of a user's identity.
  - A single user may have multiple keys
- Host Key
  - A persistent, asymmetric key used by a server as proof of its identity
  - Used by a client when proving its host's identity as part of trustedhost authentication
- Session Key
  - A randomly generated, symmetric key for encrypting the communication between an SSH client and server.
  - It can be changed during a session

# Data Encryption/Integrity

- Encryption
  - Use ciphers to encrypt and decrypt data being send over the wire
  - Block cipher such as DES, 3DES, use a shared key (session key)
  - Agree which cipher use during connection setup
  - Session keys are randomly generated by both the client and server, after host authentication and before user authentication
- Integrity
  - Message Authentication Code (MAC) in SSH2
  - Simple 32-bit CRC in SSH1

#### **User Authentication**

- Password authentication
  - The username and password are encrypted before transmission.
  - Inherently vulnerable in that they can be guessed
- Public key authentication
  - Public key and private key: generated using ssh-keygen
  - Private key should never be distributed, and should be protected by "passphrase"

## Functionality of SSH (1)

 Secure Command Shell: anything that can be done at a local machine can be done securely remotely

# Functionality of SSH (2)

- Port forwarding
  - allows data from normally unsecured TCP/IP applications to be securely sent across the encrypted tunnel,
  - multiple applications can transmit data over a single multiplexed channel.



Ref: An Overview of the Secure Shell (SSH), Vandyke Software

# Functionality of SSH (3)

- Port forwarding
  - Local port forwarding: forward data securely from another client application running on the same computer as the Secure Shell Client



# Functionality of SSH (4)

- Port forwarding
  - Remote port forwarding: enables applications on the server side of a Secure Shell connection to access services residing on the SSH's client side.



# Functionality of SSH (5)

- Secure File Transfer
  - Secure copy (SCP): RCP protocol over SSH.
  - <u>R</u>sync: intended to be more efficient than SCP
  - SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP): a secure alternative to FTP (not to be confused with FTP over SSH)
  - Files transferred over shell protocol (FISH): evolved from Unix shell command over SSH

#### Threats Addressed by SSH

- Insertion and Replay attack
  - Attacker is not only monitoring the SSH session, but is also observing the encrypted keystrokes
  - The attacker could replay the activities of the whole session, even they are encrypted.
  - But authentication and digital signature prevent such attacks.

### SSH Doesn't Prevent

- Password Cracking
- IP and TCP attacks
- Traffic Analysis

#### Threats Addressed by SSH

- Eavesdropping or Password Sniffing

   All transmitted data is encrypted
- Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM)
  - Cannot happen unless the hosts involved have been compromised or accept a public key without verifying it.



Lecture 13: Remote Terminal Services and SSH

#### Summary

- SSH port forwarding: local and remote
- Can MITM attack happen with SSH? If so, how?