This talk will present work (in progress) on the computational characterisation of interactional justice. Interactional justice is a user-centric aspect of justice required for realising requirements of fairness and inclusivity in self-organising rule-based open systems. We start from ideas due to Ashby about quasi-stability and Rawls about a well-ordered society, to give a definition of "rule quasi-stable". We then describe the implementation of a multi-agent system simulation required to bring about resource allocation in an economy of scarcity, and show that using opinion formation with respect to a social network and shared values (i.e. interactional justice) can deliver a system which is rule-quasi stable, whereas the same system which depended only on individual metrics would collapse. This will be used as a basis for a broader discussion of knowledge management in self-governing socio-technical systems, in particular addressing the fundamental design dilemma: on the one hand, the system must be sufficiently unrestricted (fluid, flexible), in order to enable a collective with a shared set of congruent values to achieve their joint purpose(s) in collective actions situations; on the other hand, the system must be sufficiently restricted (stable, robust) to prevent a subset of the group from exploiting this openness 'against itself', as it were, by usurping control of the system and running it for the benefit of their own sectional (un-shared) interests.
Last modified: Tuesday, 28-Mar-2017 11:25:46 NZDT
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