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Abstracts of contributed talks

KATALIN BIMBÓ, *A treatment for ACT.*
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ACT—action logic—is a natural extension of REG (see [2]). As it is well-known, ACT is equationally axiomatizable, however, it seems not to have a Kripke semantics. We show that insights from gaggle theory (see [1]) (as well as from the four-valued semantics of the minimal substructural logic *LS*) allow us to define a relational semantics for ACT that is adequate.

[1] J. M. Dunn, *Gaggle theory: An abstraction of Galois connections and residuation with applications to negation and various logical operations*, In J. van Eijck (ed.), ***Logics in AI: European Workshop JELIA '90***, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 478, Springer, Berlin, 1990, pp. 31–51.
[2] V. R. Pratt, *Action logic and pure induction*, In J. van Eijck (ed.), ***Logics in AI: European Workshop JELIA '90***, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 478, Springer, Berlin, 1990, pp. 97–120.

ROSS BRADY, *Normalized Natural Deduction for Some Fragments of Relevant Logics.*
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I have previously established normalized natural deduction systems for the full sentential relevant logics **DW** and **DJ**. I have also previously noted that the style of natural deduction system involved does not extend to the stronger logic **TW**, nor to its positive fragment **TW**+. However, it does apply to some other fragments of **TW**. In this paper, I will explore the normalization of fragments of the stronger relevant logics from **TW** to **R**. In the process, I will solve the decision problems for $\mathbf{T}\rightarrow$ and $\mathbf{T}\rightarrow\&$ (both of which are new results), and obtain new decision procedures for $\mathbf{R}\rightarrow$ and $\mathbf{R}\rightarrow\&$.

HANS VAN DITMARSCH AND BARTELD KOOI, *Unsuccessful updates.*
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Suppose we discuss New Zealand trees, and we tell you: “You don’t know that Hans has a kowhai tree in his garden.” Before we said so, you did not know that Hans owned such a tree, but after the announcement, that is no longer true: now you *do* know. In [1] and [2] this is called an *unsuccessful update*: a formula that becomes false after its announcement. Formally, it is a φ such that $[\varphi]\neg\varphi$ is is invalid. Here $[\varphi]$ is a dynamic modal operator for the announcement of φ. If atom p describes that Hans has a khowhai tree in his garden, and if Hans is agent 1 and you are agent 2, then $K_2 p$ stands for ‘You know that p,’ and the unsuccessful update is $p \wedge \neg K_2 p$, because $[p \wedge \neg K_2 p]\neg(p \wedge \neg K_2 p)$ is true. Analysis of information systems (card games, cryptology, ‘muddy children’) and ‘philosophical puzzles’ (Hangman Paradox) reveals a growing number of dynamic phenomena that can be described or explained by unsuccessful updates. We also investigate the syntactic characterization (sublanguage) of the successful updates, e.g., every formula of form $C\varphi$ is successful (where C stands for –entire group– common knowledge), or in other words: $[C\varphi]C\varphi$ is valid.

[1] J.D. Gerbrandy, *Bisimulations on Planet Kripke*, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1999, ILLC Dissertation Series DS-1999-01.
[2] H.P. van Ditmarsch, *Knowledge games*, PhD thesis, University of Groningen, 2000, ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2000-06.

DAVID FRIGGENS, *A modal proof theory for polynomial coalgebras.*
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Coalgebras are of increasing interest in computer science for their use in modelling certain types of data structures and state-transition systems, in particular the ever popular object-oriented programming paradigm.

There have been many different logics developed for reasoning about coalgebras of particular functors, most involving modal logic. We define a modal logic for coalgebras of polynomial functors, extending Rößiger’s logic [2], whose proof theory was limited to using finite constant sets, by adding an operation from Goldblatt [1]. From the semantics we define a canonical coalgebra that provides a natural construction of a final coalgebra for the relevant functor. We then give an infinitary axiomatization and syntactic proof relation that is sound and complete for countable constant sets.

[1] R. Goldblatt, *Equational logic of polynomial coalgebras*, In ***Advances in modal logic, volume 4*** (P. Balbiani, N.Y. Suzuki, F. Wolter, & M. Zakharyaschev, editors), King’s College Publications, London, 2003, www.aiml.net, pp. 149–184.
[2] M. Rössiger, *From modal logic to terminal coalgebras*, ***Theoretical Computer Science***, vol. 260 (2001), pp. 209–228.

RODERIC A. GIRLE, *Go with the Flow: The Natural Sequence.*
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It is sometimes suggested that the sequence of Modal Logics: **S0.5**, **S1**, **S2**, **S3**, **S4**, **S5** is not as "natural" as the sequence: **S0.5**, **S0.9**, **S2**, **S3**, **S4**, **S5**. In both sequences there is an ascending chain of validity inclusion so that, as far as theorems go: **S0.5** $\subseteq$ **S1** $\subseteq$ **S2** $\subseteq$ **S3** $\subseteq$ **S4** $\subseteq$ **S5** and **S0.5** $\subseteq$ **S0.9** $\subseteq$ **S2** $\subseteq$ **S3** $\subseteq$ **S4** $\subseteq$ **S5**. But there is also the inclusion sequence: **S0.5** $\subseteq$ **S0.9** $\subseteq$ **S1** $\subseteq$ **S2** $\subseteq$ **S3** $\subseteq$ **S4** $\subseteq$ **S5**.

The idea is that it is more natural to have **S0.9** in the sequence than **S1**. This idea is often prompted by a consideration of the axiom systems for these logics. But there is also an interesting sequence when we consider the Kripke semantics or the Model-set/model-system semantics for these systems. In the semantic sequence the simplest natural sequence does not contain either **S0.9** or **S1**, just: **S0.5** $\subseteq$ **S2** $\subseteq$ **S3** $\subseteq$ **S4** $\subseteq$ **S5**.

In this paper we will look at what might lie behind this idea of a "natural" sequence of modal logics.

GUIDO GOVERNATORI AND ANTONINO ROTOLO, *On the Axiomatization of Elgesem's Logic of Ability and Agency.*
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We investigate the semantics of the modal logic of agency and ability (LAA) proposed by Elgesem [1]. LAA is a classical bi-modal logic with the axioms: $EA \rightarrow A$, $EA \wedge EB \rightarrow E(A \wedge B)$, $EA \rightarrow CA$, and $\neg C\top$, where E and C are, respectively, the modal operators of agency and ability. For the semantics Elgesem adopts selection function models $\mathcal{S} = \langle W, f, v\rangle$, where W is a set of possible worlds, f is a function from $W \times 2^W$ to 2^W, and v is a valuation function. The modal operators are evaluated by the following clauses

$$w \models EA \text{ iff } w \in f(w, |A|) \qquad w \models CA \text{ iff } f(w, |A| \neq \emptyset)$$

where $|A| = \{w : w \models A\}$. Moreover f satisfies the conditions: $f(w, X) \subseteq X$, $f(w, X) \cap f(w, Y) \subseteq f(w, X \cap Y)$, and $f(w, W) = \emptyset$.

It is immediate to see that $\neg C\bot$ is valid in the above class of models. We propose a class of neighbourhood models $\langle W, N^C, N^E, v\rangle$ where N^C and N^E are functions from $W \times 2^W$ to 2^{2^W} such that N^E is closed under intersection, $\forall w \forall X \in N^E_w (w \in X)$, $\forall w (W \notin N^C_w)$, and $N^E \subseteq N^C$. We prove that this class of models characterises LAA, but $\neg C\bot$ is not valid. Hence LAA is incomplete with regard to the intended selection function semantics. We show how to modify the selection function semantics to regain completeness. We point out that the resulting semantics relies on non-normal worlds. Accordingly we argue that an alternative semantics can be given in terms of multi-relation Kripke models with non-normal worlds. Finally we discuss some philosophical issues about the interpretation and appropriateness of the three types of semantics.

[1] D. Elsegem. *The modal logic of agency*, ***Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic***, vol. 2(2) (1997), pp. 1–46.

SU ROGERSON, *Implicational logics and integer-based semantics: A survey.*
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The Abelian logic of Meyer and Slaney, the logic, L of Rogerson and Butchhart and the logic, R-Mingle all have models based on the integers. Is this where the similarities end? This paper explores integer-based models with particular reference to the implicational connective.

KLAUS-DIETER SCHEWE, *Weak Functional Dependencies in Higher-Order Datamodels and XML.*
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We present an axiomatisation for weak functional dependencies, i.e. disjunctions of functional dependencies, in the presence of several constructors for complex values. These constructors are the tuple constructor, list-, set- and multiset-constructors, an optionality constructor, and a union constructor. The theory is smooth and rather uniform, if the union-constructor is absent. Its presence, however, complicates all results and proofs significantly. In particular, if the union-constructor is absent, a subset of the rules is complete for the implication of ordinary functional dependencies, but this does not hold, if the union constructor is present.

HARTLEY SLATER, *Hilbert and Gödel versus Penrose and Turing.*
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Penrose has been puzzled about what Gödel's results show about our differences from machines. I demonstrate in this paper that the crucial difference is that, while computers can deal with formulas, only humans can deal with facts. That arises because a Turing machine cannot determine how its formulas are to be interpreted, while we can.

The detail of the proof involves a technical re-working of Gödel's first theorem using Hilbert's epsilon calculus. The universal statement which we can know to be true, but which systems such as PM cannot derive, is equivalent to an elementary statement involving a certain epsilon term. When we choose the standard model for Arithmetic we make that epsilon term refer to a finite number, even though, because of the possiblity of non-standard models, there is no formal proof, within the system, that the relevant epsilon term does refer to such a number. The finiteness of the referent of the epsilon term, in the standard model, means there is a finite proof of the associated universal statement.

KEES VERMEULEN, *Modal Interaction in Discourse.*
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In natural language texts indicators of modality occur that we would like to analyse as modal operators in logic. However, the modalities in texts interact in a way that is hard to transform in a compositional way into a translation into ordinary modal logic. I will introduce the basic phenomena of modal interaction by giving examples and propose an indexed form of modal logic that can account for them in a compositional way. The logic proposed obtains a dynamic semantics: formulas of the indexed modal language are interpreted as update operators on information states. Several results about the logic proposed will be discussed, most prominently a decidability result.

Examples of modal interaction:

(1) A lion might come in. It would eat you first. It will eat me later.
(2) A lion might come in. It could eat you first. It could eat me first instead.

Here the modality in each second sentence depends on the situation introduced by the first modality. Then the modalities in the third sentences interact with the previous modalities in distinct ways: 'sequentially' in (1), but more 'parallel' in (2).